Arbeitspapier
Tax Principles and Tax Harmonization under Imperfect Competition: A Cautionary Example
This paper shows that under imperfect competition the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonization may depend crucially on whether taxes are levied by the destination or the origin principle. In a standard model of imperfect competition, while harmonization always makes at least one country better off, and may be Pareto-improving, when taxes are levied under the destination principle (which currently applies in the European Union), harmonization of origin-based taxes (as recently proposed by the European Commission) is certain to be Pareto-worsening when the preferences in the two countries are identical, and is likely to be so even when they differ.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 518
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Harmonization
destination principle
origin principle
commodity taxation
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Keen, Michael
Lahiri, Sajal
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Keen, Michael
- Lahiri, Sajal
- Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2001
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