- Alternative title
-
Auktionsdesign unter finanziellen Restriktionen
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
München, Technische Universität München, Dissertation, 2024
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Keyword
-
Auktionstheorie
Auktion
Electronic Commerce
Spieltheorie
Internetauktion
Mehragentensystem
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
München
- (who)
-
Universitätsbibliothek der TU München
- (when)
-
2024
- Creator
-
Batziou, Eleni
- Contributor
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:91-diss-20241113-1729553-0-4
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:39 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Batziou, Eleni
- Bichler, Martin
- Albers, Susanne
- Universitätsbibliothek der TU München
Time of origin
- 2024
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