Arbeitspapier
Regulation under Financial Constraints
This article studies the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown marginal cost. The originality of the paper is to consider that the regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the instruments available to the regulator. The wealth constraint could change the optimal regulatory contract from a two-part tariff, where the quantities produced depend on the firm's cost, to a fixed fee where the firm produces the same quantity whatever its cost.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 16/2002
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Regulation
Publicly Provided Private Goods
- Thema
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Regulation
Asymmetric information
Monopolist
Regulierung
Budgetrestriktion
Monopol
Kostenstruktur
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gautier, Axel
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gautier, Axel
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2002