The influence of political pressure groups on the stability of international environmental agreements

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on the abatement decisions of countries. This influence affects members of an international environmental agreement as well as outsiders. However, in the case of agreement members, the effects of lobbying are not restricted to the lobby's host-country but spill over to other member countries and have ambiguous effects on the agreement stability.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics ; No. V-391-16

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Public Goods ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
• Subject: interest groups ; coalition theory ; environmental policy making ; international environmental agreements

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hagen, Achim ; Altamirano Cabrera, Juan Carlos ; Weikard, Hans-Peter
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics
• (where): Oldenburg
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148226
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET