Arbeitspapier
How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements
This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take place and/or different designs of agreements. We consider open and restricted open membership game as well as four exclusive membership games with different degrees of unanimity required to form coalitions. From a policy perspective, counterintuitively, it turns out that stability is higher under exclusive than under open membership and stability increases with the degree of unanimity. We discuss the policy implications of our result for future treaty-making.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 62.2003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
- Thema
-
Non-cooperative game theory
Rules of coalition formation
Stability
Umweltabkommen
Koalition
Theorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Finus, Michael
Rundshagen, Bianca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Finus, Michael
- Rundshagen, Bianca
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2003
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