Arbeitspapier
Coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions
The aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective International Environmental Agreements. We emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues. We argue that international institutions can intervene in the framing of the strategic interactions between countries (i.e. setting the rules of the negotiation game) and can influence the actual agreement reached when different outcomes of the negotiation game can be equilibria.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 13.1998
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Coalition formation
Environmental agreements
Institutions
Bargaining
Co-operation
Umweltabkommen
Internationale Organisation
Spieltheorie
Koalition
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ecchia, Giulio
Mariotti, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ecchia, Giulio
- Mariotti, Marco
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1998