Arbeitspapier

Central bank boards around the world: why does membership size differ?

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1897

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Thema
Geldpolitik
Zentralbank
Governance-Ansatz
Entscheidung
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Berger, Helge
Nitsch, Volker
Lybek, Tonny
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Berger, Helge
  • Nitsch, Volker
  • Lybek, Tonny
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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