Arbeitspapier

Central Bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

ISBN
3938369760
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2008/5

Classification
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Subject
Committee
council
governance
decision making
monetary policy
Geldpolitik
Zentralbank
Governance-Ansatz
Entscheidung
Welt

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Berger, Helge
Nitsch, Volker
Lybek, Tonny
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Berger, Helge
  • Nitsch, Volker
  • Lybek, Tonny
  • Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Time of origin

  • 2008

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