Arbeitspapier
Central Bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?
This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.
- ISBN
-
3938369760
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2008/5
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- Subject
-
Committee
council
governance
decision making
monetary policy
Geldpolitik
Zentralbank
Governance-Ansatz
Entscheidung
Welt
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Berger, Helge
Nitsch, Volker
Lybek, Tonny
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Berger, Helge
- Nitsch, Volker
- Lybek, Tonny
- Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Time of origin
- 2008