Arbeitspapier

Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size

Closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures. this paper uses a simple two-country model to address a range of policy concerns that consequently arise, focusing particularly on the role of national size. Differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency due to non-cooperative behavior, harming both countries. The smaller country would lose form harmonization to any tax rate between those of the non-cooperative equilibrium, but both countries would gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range. The fully optimal response to freer cross-border trade, however, may be to do absolutely nothing.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 819

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kanbur, Ravi
Keen, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
1991

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kanbur, Ravi
  • Keen, Michael
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1991

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