A continuous dilemma

Arbeitspapier

We study prisoner's dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time repeated matchings achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot control sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases and, with one-second subperiods, they approach the level seen in continuous sessions. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how the capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner's dilemma.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 657

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: prisoner's dilemma ; game theory ; laboratory experiment ; continuous time game ; Gefangenendilemma ; Dynamisches Spiel ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Friedman, Daniel ; Oprea, Ryan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of California, Economics Department
• (where): Santa Cruz, CA
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64489
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET