- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1368
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Bikhchandani, Sushil
de Vries, Sven
Schummer, James
Vohra, Rakesh
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bikhchandani, Sushil
- de Vries, Sven
- Schummer, James
- Vohra, Rakesh
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 2003
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