Arbeitspapier
Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders
This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called "sets in excess demand" is introduced, and the main results demonstrate that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. The paper also specifies a number of properties of the family of sets in excess demand and relate previously proposed selections to it.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2010:15
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Auctions
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
- Thema
-
Multi-item auctions
unit-demand
excess demand
algorithms
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Andersson, Tommy
Andersson, Christer
Talman, Adolphus Johannes Jan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Lund
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Andersson, Tommy
- Andersson, Christer
- Talman, Adolphus Johannes Jan
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012
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