Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study

Arbeitspapier

This paper considers the sealed bid and ascending auction, which both identifies the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theortical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this issue in more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of the auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed bid mechanism performs weakly better in all of investigated measures (consistent reporting, efficiency etc.). In addition, we find that the performance of the ascending auction is increasing over time, whereas the sealed bid auction shows no such tendency.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 882

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Auctions
• Subject: Auctions ; Non-manipulability ; Efficiency ; Experiments ; Auktionstheorie ; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie ; Manipulation ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Andersson, Christer ; Andersson, Ola ; Andersson, Tommy
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81486
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET