Tacit collusion under imperfect monitoring in the Canadian manufacturing industry: An empirical study

Arbeitspapier

The paper undertakes a cross-sectoral analysis of a salient empirical implication of the model of tacit collusion advanced by Abreu et al (1986). Specifically, the prevalence of a first order Markovian process for alternating between price wars and collusive periods is assessed by means of non-parametric tests. The analysis focuses on 30 different industries in Canada. The evidence provides weak support for optimal collusion in one industry, which is consistent with the idea that such collusive arrangements are unusual.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3623

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
• Thema: tacit collusion ; game theory ; Canada ; price war

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Resende, Marcelo ; Zeidan, Rodrigo M.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52494
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ