Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making: An experimental analysis

Arbeitspapier

In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A's decision before making their own. There are four treatments: three with deterrence and one without. We find a peer effect in embezzlement in that facing an honest Official A reduces embezzlement by Official B. Likewise, deterrence matters in that higher detection probabilities significantly decrease embezzlement. Crucially, detection is more effective in curbing embezzlement when chosen by an honest Official A compared to a corrupt Official A at almost all individual detection levels. This 'legitimacy' effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies can fail in countries where the government itself is believed to be corrupt.

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• ISBN: 978-92-9256-181-9
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WIDER Working Paper ; No. 2016/137

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Subject: corruption ; deterrence ; embezzlement ; laboratory experiment ; legitimacy ; peer effect

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Boly, Amadou ; Gillanders, Robert ; Miettinen, Topi
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2016

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2016/181-9
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161520