Artikel
Effective anti-corruption policy-making: What can we learn from experimental economics?
Experimental studies have shown that deterrence (monitoring and punishment) can be an effective anti-corruption policy. Even when they themselves stand to lose, policymakers may enact deterrence policies with real teeth ... However, policymakers' legitimacy is crucial: a given deterrence policy is more effective when chosen by an honest policymaker as opposed to a corrupt one.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: PEGNet Policy Brief ; No. 9/2017
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Boly, Amadou
Gillanders, Robert
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Poverty Reduction, Equity and Growth Network (PEGNet)
- (where)
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Kiel
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Boly, Amadou
- Gillanders, Robert
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Poverty Reduction, Equity and Growth Network (PEGNet)
Time of origin
- 2017
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Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making: An experimental analysis
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From Anti-Corruption to Economics: An Extension of Tsai et al. (2021)
Is Transparency an Anti-Corruption Myth?
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The New Brazilian Anti-Corruption Law
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