Arbeitspapier

Is Transparency an Anti-Corruption Myth?

We look at the effect of transparency on the incidence of costly back-scratching in a laboratory setting by implementing player identification via photographs. In our experimental design players have an incentive to form bilateral alliances in which they favour their partner at the expense of others. We find no improvement in overall group payoffs from transparency. A plausible story that fits our results is that there may be two countervailing forces at play. First, more rapid alliance formation due to social cues from the photographs being used as a coordination device to facilitate faster alliance formation between some players. Second, shorter alliances due to prosocial forces at the group level. We draw out lessons for policy makers about the limits of transparency in curtailing "grey" types of corruption.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10683

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
experiment
alliance
corruption
transparency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Murray, Cameron K.
Frijters, Paul
Schaffner, Markus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Murray, Cameron K.
  • Frijters, Paul
  • Schaffner, Markus
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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