Why do firms have boards?

Arbeitspapier

In a world where corporate boards are not required by law, I identify a governance and a distribute motive for board establishment and board composition. I investigate the presence of these motives in a sample of 23.000+ closely held corporations. Board frequency increases with more owners, if control is diluted and in larger firms. Given firms have a board, non-controlling owners are more likely to be on the board when controlling owners are more powerful. Finally, consistent with an equilibrium interpretation of strategic board establishment, I find little effect of the presence of boards on performance. I conclude that both motives are significant and discuss related corporate governance implications.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working paper ; No. 3-2002

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Corporate Finance and Governance: General ; Firm Organization and Market Structure
• Thema: Boards ; governance ; distributive conflicts ; ultimate ownership

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bennedsen, Morten
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
• (wo): Frederiksberg
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208452
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ