Arbeitspapier

Why do firms engage in selective hedging?

Surveys of corporate risk management document that selective hedging, where managers incorporate their market views into firms' hedging programs, is widespread in the U.S. and other countries. Stulz (1996) argues that selective hedging could enhance the value of firms that possess an information advantage relative to the market and have the financial strength to withstand the additional risk from market timing. We study the practice of selective hedging in a 10-year sample of North American gold mining firms and find that selective hedging is most prevalent among firms that are least likely to meet these valuemaximizing criteria - (a) smaller firms, i.e., firms that are least likely to have private information about future gold prices; and (b) firms that are closest to financial distress. The latter finding provides support for the alternative possibility suggested by Stulz that selective hedging may also be driven by asset substitution motives. We detect weak relationships between selective hedging and some corporate governance measures, especially board size, but find no evidence of a link between selective hedging and managerial compensation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2012-019

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Corporate Finance and Governance: Other
Thema
corporate risk management
selective hedging
speculation
financial distress
corporate governance
managerial compensation
Goldbergbau
Risikomanagement
Hedging
Spekulation
Corporate Governance
Managervergütung
Schätzung
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Adam, Tim R.
Fernando, Chitru S.
Salas, Jesus M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Adam, Tim R.
  • Fernando, Chitru S.
  • Salas, Jesus M.
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk

Entstanden

  • 2012

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