Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings

Arbeitspapier

This paper treats illegal landings as a moral hazard problem that arises, since individual catches are unobservable to society and hence private information. A tax/subsidy mechanism taking into account the asymmetric information problem is formulated as a solution to problems with illegal landings. The incentive scheme uses fish stock size as the tax variable, and can be seen as an alternative to a control policy. Rough estimates from a simulation study suggest that the incentive scheme is potentially useful. The incentive scheme also has potential application as an instrument to the solution of by-catch and discard problems.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IME Working Paper ; No. 9

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Fischereiressourcen ; Schattenwirtschaft ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Jensen, Frank ; Vestergaard, Niels
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics (IME)
• (where): Esbjerg
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/83065
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET