Arbeitspapier
Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings
This paper treats illegal landings as a moral hazard problem that arises, since individual catches are unobservable to society and hence private information. A tax/subsidy mechanism taking into account the asymmetric information problem is formulated as a solution to problems with illegal landings. The incentive scheme uses fish stock size as the tax variable, and can be seen as an alternative to a control policy. Rough estimates from a simulation study suggest that the incentive scheme is potentially useful. The incentive scheme also has potential application as an instrument to the solution of by-catch and discard problems.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IME Working Paper ; No. 9
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Fischereiressourcen
Schattenwirtschaft
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jensen, Frank
Vestergaard, Niels
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics (IME)
- (wo)
-
Esbjerg
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jensen, Frank
- Vestergaard, Niels
- University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics (IME)
Entstanden
- 2000
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