Arbeitspapier
The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees
This paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then allocate adjacent experts such that an expert's ability tends to vary inversely with the size of his committee. In the special case of three-member committees, we show that the optimal allocation maximizes the sum of the products of the experts' skills in each committee.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5859
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
unanimity rule
extremely asymmetric committees
optimal composition of committees
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ban-Yashar, Ruth
Danziger, Leif
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ban-Yashar, Ruth
- Danziger, Leif
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2016
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees
Symmetric and asymmetric committees
Symmetric and asymmetric committees
First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees
Quota manipulation and fair voting rules in committees
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees
Economics of Committees
US monetary policy rules: The case for asymmetric preferences
Inflation targeting rules and welfare in an asymmetric currency area
The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees
Symmetric and asymmetric committees
Symmetric and asymmetric committees
First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees
Quota manipulation and fair voting rules in committees
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees
Economics of Committees
US monetary policy rules: The case for asymmetric preferences
Inflation targeting rules and welfare in an asymmetric currency area
The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees
Symmetric and asymmetric committees
Symmetric and asymmetric committees
First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees
Quota manipulation and fair voting rules in committees
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees
Economics of Committees
US monetary policy rules: The case for asymmetric preferences