Arbeitspapier
The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees
This paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then allocate adjacent experts such that an expert's ability tends to vary inversely with the size of his committee. In the special case of three-member committees, we show that the optimal allocation maximizes the sum of the products of the experts' skills in each committee.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5859
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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unanimity rule
extremely asymmetric committees
optimal composition of committees
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ban-Yashar, Ruth
Danziger, Leif
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2016
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ban-Yashar, Ruth
- Danziger, Leif
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2016