Arbeitspapier

The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees

This paper analyzes how to allocate experts into committees that use the unanimity rule to make decisions. We show that an optimal allocation of experts is extremely asymmetric. To reach the optimal allocation, therefore, one needs only to rank the experts in terms of their abilities and then allocate adjacent experts such that an expert's ability tends to vary inversely with the size of his committee. In the special case of three-member committees, we show that the optimal allocation maximizes the sum of the products of the experts' skills in each committee.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5859

Classification
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
unanimity rule
extremely asymmetric committees
optimal composition of committees

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ban-Yashar, Ruth
Danziger, Leif
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ban-Yashar, Ruth
  • Danziger, Leif
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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