Arbeitspapier
On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market
We consider a market for vertically differentiated goods where firms enter over time, after having developed innovations characterized by different quality levels. We show that the adaptation of a patent system limiting the quality range available to later entrants is socially undesirable, in that it builds a barrier to entry to the advantage of the first innovators.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 376
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
Tedeschi, Pietro
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2000
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4933
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Tedeschi, Pietro
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2000
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Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly
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The Dynamics of Disease in a Regulated Vertically Differentiated Health System
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Choosing Roles in a Duopoly for Endogenously Differentiated Products
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Growth in a Differentiated Oligopoly with Product Innovation
Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in A Differentiated Duopoly
Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly
Process and Product Innovation in a Vertically Differentiated Monopoly
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition
The Dynamics of Disease in a Regulated Vertically Differentiated Health System
Market Coverage and the Existence of Equilibrium in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Process and product innovation in a vertically differentiated industry
On the Regulation of A Vertically Differentiated Market Through Taxation/Subsidization of Product Quality
Choosing Roles in a Duopoly for Endogenously Differentiated Products
Equilibrium Locations in A Spatial Model With Sequential Entry in Real Time