Arbeitspapier
Equilibrium Locations in A Spatial Model With Sequential Entry in Real Time
I describe the entry process in a spatial market over an infinite time horizon. I show that, as long as the strategy space at the location stage is unbounded, the results derived from the single-period Stackelberg model of entry coincide with those obtained in the infinite horizon model. On the contrary, if the strategy space is bounded, then the later the follower enters, the closer to the center of the market the leader locates at the initial date.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 326
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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1998
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4982
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 1998
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Adjustment to Equilibrium after a Demand Shock: A Strategic Interaction View
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