Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game ; 34
Research paper series / Thurgau Institute of Economics at the University of Konstanz / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut ; 34
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Creator
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-74635
- Rights
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Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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14.08.2025, 11:00 AM CEST
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