- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Reciprocity and Resistance to Comprehensive Reform ; 51
Research paper series / Thurgau Institute of Economics at the University of Konstanz / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut ; 51
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-119864
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 11:01 MESZ
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