Arbeitspapier
Anchored strategic reasoning
Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players' beliefs about others' behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player's choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents' intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 314
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
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Anchoring Bias
Auctions
Games
Incomplete Information
Strategy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Seres, Gyula
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
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München und Berlin
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
- Seres, Gyula
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2022