Arbeitspapier

Anchored strategic reasoning

Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players' beliefs about others' behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player's choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents' intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 314

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Anchoring Bias
Auctions
Games
Incomplete Information
Strategy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
Seres, Gyula
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
(wo)
München und Berlin
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
  • Seres, Gyula
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition

Entstanden

  • 2022

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