Anchored strategic reasoning

Arbeitspapier

Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players' beliefs about others' behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player's choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents' intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 314

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡ ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: Anchoring Bias ; Auctions ; Games ; Incomplete Information ; Strategy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta ; Seres, Gyula
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
• (wo): München und Berlin
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/256781
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ