Arbeitspapier
When and Why Do Buyers Rate in Online Markets?
Online ratings play an important role in many markets. We study the often disputed information content of these ratings, by proposing a reduced-form Bayesian model of the typical buyer's rating decision. Our empirical evidence based on eBay raw data is in line with even intricate predictions from it. We thus have good reasons to calibrate the model to moments of the data. Our simulations suggest that the rating record reveals the seller's type after about 100 transactions, or 65-70 ratings.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9562
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
- Thema
-
online markets
rating
reputation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hui, Xiang
Klein, Tobias J.
Stahl, Konrad O.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hui, Xiang
- Klein, Tobias J.
- Stahl, Konrad O.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2022
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