Knowledge Transfer in Buyer-Supplier Relationships - When It (Not) Occurs

Arbeitspapier

Abuyer?s technical knowledge may increase the efficiency of its supplier. Suppliers, however, frequently maintain relationships with additional buyers. Knowledge disclosure then bears the risk of benefiting one?s own competitor due to opportunistic knowledge transmission through the common supplier. We show that in one-shot relationships no knowledge disclosure takes place because the supplier has an incentive for knowledge transmission and, in anticipation of this outcome, buyers refuse to disclose any of their knowledge. In repeated relationships knowledge disclosure is stabilized by larger technological proximity between buyers and suppliers and destabilized by the absolute value of the knowledge.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: RWI Discussion Papers ; No. 34

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Subject: Knowledge Transfer ; Knowledge Spillovers ; Cooperation ; Innovation ; Repeated Games

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bönte, Werner ; Wiethaus, Lars
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
• (where): Essen
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18585
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET