Arbeitspapier

Why powerful buyers finance suppliers' R&D

It is a common concern that pricing pressure by powerful buyers discourages suppliers' R&D investments. Employing a simple monopsonist - competitive upstream industry - framework, this paper qualifies this view in two respects. First, the monopsonist has an incentive to subsidize upstream R&D which yields more upstream R&D and higher profits in both industries than the monopsonist's commitment to higher prices. Secondly, in the presence of intra-industry R&D spillovers between upstream firms, the monopsonist has an even stronger incentive to finance upstream R&D. If the monopsonist finances more than fifty percent of suppliers R&D efforts, R&D investments in upstream industry will be higher than in the case of buyer competition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Schumpeter Discussion Papers ; No. 2008-004

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Thema
Vertical Relationships
Monopsony
Buyer Power
R&D
Knowledge Spillovers
Nachfragemacht
Monopson
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Industrielle Forschung
Lieferant
Wissenstransfer
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bönte, Werner
Wiethaus, Lars
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Wuppertal, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics
(wo)
Wuppertal
(wann)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hbz:468-20080514
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bönte, Werner
  • Wiethaus, Lars
  • University of Wuppertal, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

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