Arbeitspapier
Why powerful buyers finance suppliers' R&D
It is a common concern that pricing pressure by powerful buyers discourages suppliers' R&D investments. Employing a simple monopsonist - competitive upstream industry - framework, this paper qualifies this view in two respects. First, the monopsonist has an incentive to subsidize upstream R&D which yields more upstream R&D and higher profits in both industries than the monopsonist's commitment to higher prices. Secondly, in the presence of intra-industry R&D spillovers between upstream firms, the monopsonist has an even stronger incentive to finance upstream R&D. If the monopsonist finances more than fifty percent of suppliers R&D efforts, R&D investments in upstream industry will be higher than in the case of buyer competition.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Schumpeter Discussion Papers ; No. 2008-004
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
- Thema
-
Vertical Relationships
Monopsony
Buyer Power
R&D
Knowledge Spillovers
Nachfragemacht
Monopson
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Industrielle Forschung
Lieferant
Wissenstransfer
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bönte, Werner
Wiethaus, Lars
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Wuppertal, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics
- (wo)
-
Wuppertal
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:468-20080514
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bönte, Werner
- Wiethaus, Lars
- University of Wuppertal, Schumpeter School of Business and Economics
Entstanden
- 2008