Arbeitspapier

Forward Induction in Arms Races

I investigate a two-country non cooperative game where the status quo ante is asymmetric as one country is endowed with nuclear weapons while the other is not and is evaluating the opportunity of build up a nuclear arsenal. After identifying the conditions on payoffs such that the resulting reduced form is a coordination game with two symmetric equilibria, I resort to forward induction to show that the implicit signaling mechanism in it may lead countries to select the peaceful equilibrium in a symmetric environment where both are endowed with analogous arsenals.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 742

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy: General

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lambertini, Luca
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4498
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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