Forward Induction in Arms Races

Arbeitspapier

I investigate a two-country non cooperative game where the status quo ante is asymmetric as one country is endowed with nuclear weapons while the other is not and is evaluating the opportunity of build up a nuclear arsenal. After identifying the conditions on payoffs such that the resulting reduced form is a coordination game with two symmetric equilibria, I resort to forward induction to show that the implicit signaling mechanism in it may lead countries to select the peaceful equilibrium in a symmetric environment where both are endowed with analogous arsenals.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 742

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy: General

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lambertini, Luca
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (where): Bologna
• (when): 2011

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4498
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159583
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET