Arbeitspapier
Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation
Contributing to the literature on the consequences of behavioral biases for market outcomes and institutional design, we contrast producer liability and minimum quality standard regulation as alternative means of social control of product-related torts when consumers are heterogeneously overconfident about the risk of harm. We elucidate the role of factors shaping the relative desirability of strict liability vis-à-vis minimum quality standard regulation from a social welfare standpoint. We also clarify when and why joint use of strict liability and minimum quality standard regulation welfare dominates the exclusive use of either mode of social control of torts.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Economics of Regulation
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
-
product risk
overconfidence
consumer heterogeneity
tort law
minimum quality standard
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Baniak, Andrzej
Grajzl, Peter
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Baniak, Andrzej
- Grajzl, Peter
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014
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