Arbeitspapier
An Optimal Signaling Equilibrium
This paper analyses the optimal combination of costly and costless messages that a Sender uses in a signaling game if he is able to choose among all equilibrium communication strategies. We provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium that maximizes the Sender's ex ante expected utility in case of uniformly distributed types and quadratic loss functions. First, the Sender often wants to avoid money burning by using the most informative cheap talk communication strategy. Second, if he does burn money, he avoids separation and only re-arranges the existing intervals of the most informative cheap talk equilibrium, possibly adding one extra interval. Money burning takes place in the second interval only.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-148/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Cheap talk
money burning
optimal equilibrium
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Karamychev, Vladimir
Visser, Bauke
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Karamychev, Vladimir
- Visser, Bauke
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2011
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