Arbeitspapier
Honesty in a Signaling Model of Tax Evasion
We study the phenomenon of tax evasion using a simple signaling model, in which the signal is taxpayer's reported income. The novelty of our approach lies in the way we define honesty. Specifically, we advocate the view that there are no absolutely honest taxpayers: all taxpayers may under certain conditions become evaders. We investigate the implications of this type of honesty on the equilibria of the model, and compare it to the basic case, in which honesty is absent. Our analysis completely characterizes all perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game, assesses their stability and welfare properties.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-022/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Thema
-
Auditing
equilibrium refinements
tax morale
underground economies
Steuerstrafrecht
Signalling
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pruzhansky, Vitaly
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pruzhansky, Vitaly
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2004