Signaling and Screening of Workers' Motivation

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information. While posting a higher wage increases the probability of filling the vacancy, it decreases the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated workers are induced to apply. The optimal wage scheme entails a trade-off between the probability of filling the vacancy, the rents left to the worker, and the expected worker's motivation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 02-050/3

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
• Subject: signaling and screening models ; intrinsic motivation ; monetary incentive schemes ; minimum wages. ; Leistungsanreiz ; Anreizvertrag ; Signalling ; Mindestlohn ; Leistungsmotivation ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Delfgaauw, Josse ; Dur, Robert A.J.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85784
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET