Arbeitspapier
Consumer myopia, competition and the incentives to unshroud add-on information
This paper studies unshrouding decisions in a framework similar to Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but considers an alternative unshrouding mechanism where the impact of advertising add-on information depends on the number of unshrouding firms. We show that shrouding becomes less prevalent as the number of competing firms increases. With unshrouding costs a non-monotonic relationship between the number of firms and unshrouding may arise.
- ISBN
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978-3-86304-125-0
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 126
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
- Subject
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Bounded rationality
Add-on pricing
Shrouding
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Wenzel, Tobias
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (where)
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Düsseldorf
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Wenzel, Tobias
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Time of origin
- 2013