Konferenzbeitrag
Add-on Pricing, Consumer Myopia and Regulatory Intervention
Previous research shows that firms may offer excessively high (and shrouded) add-on prices in competitive markets when some consumers are myopic. We analyze the effects of regulatory intervention via educating myopic consumers on equilibrium strategies of firms, consumer protection and welfare. Our model allows firms to price discriminate between consumers. We show that intervention may actually decrease social welfare and weaken consumer protection if regulatory efforts are insufficient to alter the equilibrium strategy of firms. In consequence, regulation may do more harm than good and hence should only be considered if the regulator can be sure to have a good understanding of pricing strategies in an industry.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Regulation and Pricing Policies ; No. F8-V2
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
- Thema
-
bounded rationality
information suppression
regulation
social welfare
consumer protection
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schüwer, Ulrich
Kosfeld, Michael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Schüwer, Ulrich
- Kosfeld, Michael
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Entstanden
- 2010