Arbeitspapier

Consumer myopia, competition and the incentives to unshroud add-on information

This paper studies unshrouding decisions in a framework similar to Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but considers an alternative unshrouding mechanism where the impact of advertising add-on information depends on the number of unshrouding firms. We show that shrouding becomes less prevalent as the number of competing firms increases. With unshrouding costs a non-monotonic relationship between the number of firms and unshrouding may arise.

ISBN
978-3-86304-125-0
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 126

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Subject
Bounded rationality
Add-on pricing
Shrouding

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Wenzel, Tobias
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(where)
Düsseldorf
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Wenzel, Tobias
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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