Discrimination and Workers' Expectations

Arbeitspapier

The paper explores the role of workers? expectations as an original explanation for the puzzling long run persistence of observed discrimination against some minorities in the labor market. A game of incomplete information is presented, showing that ex ante identical groups of workers may be characterized by unequal outcomes in equilibrium due to their different beliefs, even though discriminatory tastes and statistical discrimination by employers have disappeared. Wrong beliefs of being discriminated against are self-confirming in this circumstance, being the ultimate cause of a lower percentage of promotions which supports these wrong beliefs.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 823

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Expectations; Speculations ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other ; Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination ; Labor Discrimination
• Subject: discrimination ; workers? expectations ; self-confirming beliefs ; Arbeitsmarktdiskriminierung ; Ethnische Diskriminierung ; Dynamisches Spiel ; Unvollkommene Information ; Arbeitsproduktivität ; Erwartungstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Filippin, Antonio
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20068
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET