Politically Correct Information Adoption

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyses the case when the political struggle not is channeled through policy choices, but through what information to adopt. The paper presents a simple model to analyze collective decisions of adopting new information when different parties' payoffs are contingent upon the new information. In equilibrium we demonstrate that the adopted information is biased towards "political correctness" rather than being informative (in the Blackwell sense). These results may be relevant when designing decision mechanisms for institutions that are to be keen on new information.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2000:5

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
• Thema: Informativeness ; Majority Rule ; Political Correctness

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Holm, Håkan J.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (wo): Lund
• (wann): 2000

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/259835
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ