Arbeitspapier
Politically Feasible Reforms of Non-Linear Tax Systems
We present a conceptual framework for the analysis of politically feasible tax reforms. First, we prove a median voter theorem for monotonic reforms of non-linear tax systems. This yields a characterization of reforms that are preferred by a majority of individuals over the status quo and hence politically feasible. Second, we show that every Pareto-efficient tax systems is such that moving towards lower tax rates for below-median incomes and towards higher rates for above median incomes is politically feasible. Third, we develop a method for diagnosing whether a given tax system admits reforms that are welfare-improving and/ or politically feasible.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6573
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Thema
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non-linear income taxation
tax reforms
political economy
welfare analysis
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bierbrauer, Felix
Boyer, Pierre C.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Boyer, Pierre C.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2017