Politically feasible reforms of non-linear tax systems

Arbeitspapier

We study reforms of non-linear income tax systems from a political economy perspective. We present a median voter theorem for monotonic tax reforms, reforms so that the change in the tax burden is a monotonic function of income. We also provide an empirical analysis of tax reforms, with a focus on the US. We show that past reforms have, by and large, been monotonic. We also show that support by the median voter was aligned with majority support in the population. Finally, we develop sufficient statistics that enable to test whether a given tax system admits a politically feasible reform.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 236

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
• Thema: Non-linear income taxation ; Tax reforms ; Political economy ; Optimal taxation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bierbrauer, Felix ; Boyer, Pierre C. ; Peichl, Andreas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
• (wo): München und Berlin
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222133
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ