Arbeitspapier
Adverse selection, risk sharing and business cycles
I consider a real business cycle model in which agents have private information about an idiosyncratic shock to their value of leisure. I consider the mechanism design problem for this economy and describe a computational method to solve it. This is an important contribution of the paper since the method could be used to solve a wide class of models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate uncertainty. Calibrating the model to U.S. data I find a striking result: That the information frictions that plague the economy have no effects on business cycle fluctuations.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2014-10
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
Computable General Equilibrium Models
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- Subject
-
adverse selection
risk sharing
business cycles
private information
incentives
optimal contracts
computational methods
heterogeneous agents
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Veracierto, Marcelo
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
- (where)
-
Chicago, IL
- (when)
-
2014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Veracierto, Marcelo
- Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Time of origin
- 2014
Other Objects (12)
An Experimental Investigation of Risk Sharing and Adverse Selection
Information sharing and lending market competition under strong adverse selection
Economic growth and longevity risk with adverse selection
Adverse selection and risk adjustment under imperfect competition
Equilibria in health exchanges: Adverse selection vs. reclassification risk
Time, Risk, Precommitment, and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets
Long-Term Care Insurance: Knowledge Barriers, Risk Perception and Adverse Selection
Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach
Long-Term Care Insurance: Knowledge Barriers, Risk Perception and Adverse Selection
Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection
Optimal insurance with adverse selection
Efficiency, Adverse Selection, and Production
An Experimental Investigation of Risk Sharing and Adverse Selection
Information sharing and lending market competition under strong adverse selection
Economic growth and longevity risk with adverse selection
Adverse selection and risk adjustment under imperfect competition
Equilibria in health exchanges: Adverse selection vs. reclassification risk
Time, Risk, Precommitment, and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets
Long-Term Care Insurance: Knowledge Barriers, Risk Perception and Adverse Selection
Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach
Long-Term Care Insurance: Knowledge Barriers, Risk Perception and Adverse Selection
Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection
Optimal insurance with adverse selection
Efficiency, Adverse Selection, and Production
An Experimental Investigation of Risk Sharing and Adverse Selection
Information sharing and lending market competition under strong adverse selection
Economic growth and longevity risk with adverse selection
Adverse selection and risk adjustment under imperfect competition
Equilibria in health exchanges: Adverse selection vs. reclassification risk
Time, Risk, Precommitment, and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets
Long-Term Care Insurance: Knowledge Barriers, Risk Perception and Adverse Selection
Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach
Long-Term Care Insurance: Knowledge Barriers, Risk Perception and Adverse Selection
Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection
Optimal insurance with adverse selection