A comparison of zero- and minimal-intelligence agendas in majority-rule voting models
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource, 1 online resource.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
A comparison of zero- and minimal-intelligence agendas in majority-rule voting models ; day:26 ; month:5 ; year:2023 ; pages:1-35
Journal of economic interaction and coordination ; (26.5.2023), 1-35
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s11403-023-00387-8
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023091108314658895190
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:54 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Brewer, Paul J.
- Juybari, Jeremy
- Moberly, Raymond
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Majority voting leads to unanimity
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Why Should Majority Voting Be Unfair?
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Efficient Card-Based Majority Voting Protocols
One Obstacle among Many: The Filibuster and Majority Party Agendas
Majority Voting Rules as Behavior Toward Risk
Short-term Deviations from Simple Majority Voting
More EU Decisions by qualified majority voting - but how? Legal and political options for extending qualified majority voting
More EU decisions by qualified majority voting - but how? : legal and political options for extending qualified majority voting
Clicking and Voting: Agendas of Voting Advice Applications (VAA) for the European Elections 2019
The Condorcet set: Majority voting over interconnected propositions
Majority voting leads to unanimity
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Why Should Majority Voting Be Unfair?
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Efficient Card-Based Majority Voting Protocols
One Obstacle among Many: The Filibuster and Majority Party Agendas
Majority Voting Rules as Behavior Toward Risk
Short-term Deviations from Simple Majority Voting
More EU Decisions by qualified majority voting - but how? Legal and political options for extending qualified majority voting
More EU decisions by qualified majority voting - but how? : legal and political options for extending qualified majority voting
Clicking and Voting: Agendas of Voting Advice Applications (VAA) for the European Elections 2019
The Condorcet set: Majority voting over interconnected propositions
Majority voting leads to unanimity
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Why Should Majority Voting Be Unfair?
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Efficient Card-Based Majority Voting Protocols
One Obstacle among Many: The Filibuster and Majority Party Agendas
Majority Voting Rules as Behavior Toward Risk
Short-term Deviations from Simple Majority Voting
More EU Decisions by qualified majority voting - but how? Legal and political options for extending qualified majority voting
More EU decisions by qualified majority voting - but how? : legal and political options for extending qualified majority voting
Clicking and Voting: Agendas of Voting Advice Applications (VAA) for the European Elections 2019