Arbeitspapier
Network Externality and the Coordination Problem: A Generalization of Rohlfs's Model
We show that Rholfs's (1974) model is a special case of a spatial monopoly model à la Hotelling (1929) with quadratic transportation costs, where location is exogenous and the good yealds no intrinsic utility. By relaxing these assumptions, we prove that the coordination problem typically thought to affect markets for network goods may not arise in general. Endogenizing location makes it easier for the monopolist to extract consumer surplus but also to cover the entire market.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 471
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lambertini, Luca
Orsini, Raimondello
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2003
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4823
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Orsini, Raimondello
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2003
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