Arbeitspapier | Working paper
Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
- Extent
-
Seite(n): 14
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Status: Veröffentlichungsversion
- Bibliographic citation
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IHS Working Paper (10)
- Subject
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Wirtschaft
Management
Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und Schulen, Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Führung
Interaktion
Kooperation
soziales Dilemma
öffentliches Gut
Experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Angelova, Vera
Güth, Werner
Kocher, Martin G.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien
- (where)
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Österreich, Wien
- (when)
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2019
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66132-3
- Rights
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GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Last update
-
21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Angelova, Vera
- Güth, Werner
- Kocher, Martin G.
- Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien
Time of origin
- 2019
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Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
(Non-) behavioral economics: a programmatic assessment
Robust learning experiments: Evidence for learning and deliberation
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
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Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach