Arbeitspapier

Anti- versus Pro-Competitive Mergers

In a framework where mergers are mutually excluding, I show that firms pursue anti- rather than (alternative) pro-competitive mergers. Potential outsiders to anti-competitive mergers refrain from pursuing pro-competitive mergers if the positive externalities from anti-competitive mergers are strong enough. Potential outsiders to pro-competitive mergers pursue anti-competitive mergers if the negative externalities from the pro-competitive mergers are strong enough. Potential participants in anti-competitive mergers are cheap targets due to the risk of becoming outsiders to pro-competitive mergers. Firms may even pursue an unprofitable and anti-competitive merger, when alternative mergers are profitable and pro-competitive.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 694

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Thema
Anti- and Pro-Competitive Mergers
Consumers' Welfare
Coalition Formation
Endogenous Split of Surplus
Fusion
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Konsumentenrente
Wirtschaftsmodell

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
  • Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Entstanden

  • 2007

Ähnliche Objekte (12)