Anti- versus Pro-Competitive Mergers

Arbeitspapier

In a framework where mergers are mutually excluding, I show that firms pursue anti- rather than (alternative) pro-competitive mergers. Potential outsiders to anti-competitive mergers refrain from pursuing pro-competitive mergers if the positive externalities from anti-competitive mergers are strong enough. Potential outsiders to pro-competitive mergers pursue anti-competitive mergers if the negative externalities from the pro-competitive mergers are strong enough. Potential participants in anti-competitive mergers are cheap targets due to the risk of becoming outsiders to pro-competitive mergers. Firms may even pursue an unprofitable and anti-competitive merger, when alternative mergers are profitable and pro-competitive.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 694

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Subject: Anti- and Pro-Competitive Mergers ; Consumers' Welfare ; Coalition Formation ; Endogenous Split of Surplus ; Fusion ; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ; Konsumentenrente ; Wirtschaftsmodell

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81184
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET