Arbeitspapier
Anti-dumping regulations: Anti-competitive and anti-export
In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an anti-dumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the domestic firm to reduce the degree of competition in the domestic market. The domestic firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the domestic firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the domestic market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2008/27
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
anti-dumping regulations
Bertrand oligopoly
strategic behaviour
Wettbewerbspolitik
Antidumping
Duopol
Betriebliche Preispolitik
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Collie, David R.
Vo Phuong Mai Le
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
- (wo)
-
Cardiff
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Collie, David R.
- Vo Phuong Mai Le
- Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Entstanden
- 2008