Arbeitspapier

Anti-dumping regulations: Anti-competitive and anti-export

In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an anti-dumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the domestic firm to reduce the degree of competition in the domestic market. The domestic firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the domestic firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the domestic market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2008/27

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
anti-dumping regulations
Bertrand oligopoly
strategic behaviour
Wettbewerbspolitik
Antidumping
Duopol
Betriebliche Preispolitik
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Collie, David R.
Vo Phuong Mai Le
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(wo)
Cardiff
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Collie, David R.
  • Vo Phuong Mai Le
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Entstanden

  • 2008

Ähnliche Objekte (12)